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Abstract 
Failures in optical networks are inevitable. They may occur 
during work being done for the maintenance of other 
infrastructures, or on a larger scale as the result of an attack or 
large-scale disaster. As a result, service availability, an 
important aspect of Quality of Service (QoS), is often 
degraded. Appropriate fault recovery techniques are thus 
crucial to meet the requirements set by the Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) between the carriers and their customers. 
In this paper, we focus on practical issues related to the 
deployment of fault recovery mechanisms in commercial optical 
networks. In particular, we outline the most important 
functionalities that, to our knowledge, need to be implemented, 
as well as discuss the related problems making deployment of 
fault recovery mechanisms difficult. Investigated topics include: 
fault recovery challenges (fault detection, location, and 
recovery), multiple failures recovery, as well as application of 
reliability mechanisms in elastic optical networks, and in 
multiprovider multilevel networks.  
   
Keywords: dependability · reliability · availability · resilience 
· survivability · fault tolerance · fault recovery · multiple 
failures · multilevel multiprovider optical networks · 
implementation issues 
 
1. Introduction 
Network survivability, defined in [1] as the ability to provide 
continuous service in the presence of failures, is a critical issue 
for high-bandwidth backbone optical networks with arbitrary 
mesh topologies. Failures in fiber-optic networks occur often 
due to the fact that they are a cable-based technology and the 
infrastructure is co-located with networks for other utilities. 
Thus, damages usually happen during work being done for the 
maintenance of other infrastructures.  
Furthermore, due to the use of wavelength division 
multiplexing (WDM) technology in these networks, each fiber 
can carry an extremely high volume of traffic, thus more traffic 
is concentrated on fewer routes, increasing the number of 
customers that can be potentially affected by a failure.  
In this paper, we focus on deployment issues of fault 
recovery mechanisms in commercial optical networks. In 
particular, we discuss the current needs concerning 
implementation of failure recovery techniques as well as the 
related problems following e.g., from hardware constraints.  
Over the past two decades, various approaches have been 
proposed for the recovery of the traffic when a failure event 
occurs. They are mainly based on utilization of alternate paths, 
called backup paths (BPs), used to redirect the traffic after a 
failure of a network element affecting the primary routes, called 
working paths (WPs) [2]. Specific schemes of backup routes 
include link-, path-, segment-, and cycle-based techniques.  
The general requirement when providing protection against 
failures of nodes/links is that the respective backup paths should 
be node- (link-) disjoint from the working paths being protected 
[3]. Additionally, link capacities reserved for backup paths can 
be shared along certain links, if the considered backup paths 
protect mutually disjoint working paths [2]. Failures of single 
links/nodes are the most frequent types of failures. However, 
due to the often observed inter-failure correlation, a large set of 
solutions is dedicated to the case of multiple failures, i.e., a 
simultaneous failure of several network elements [4].  
Survivability can be provided either in a proactive way - 
using a protection strategy, implying establishment of a backup 
path before the occurrence of a failure (i.e., at the time of 
working path establishment), or by means of a reactive 
restoration strategy. In the latter case, the network tries to 
establish a new connection using available resources only after a 
failure has occurred. Protection typically has faster recovery 
speed but lower resource-efficiency than restoration [5]. 
There are many types of service disruptions in optical 
networks, which can be classified in two major types: soft and 
hard failures [6]. Hard failures, such as fiber cuts and failure of 
a network linecard occur suddenly and have a severe impact on 
services, causing major loss of traffic. Soft failures, such as 
aging of an amplifier, cause subtle changes in performance, 
resulting in a wide spectrum of service degradations which are 
far more difficult to detect and localize.  
Some failures, called self-reported, are very easily detected 
because they interfere with the correct functioning of the 
upstream device and are flagged by internal control 
mechanisms. Most hard and a large number of soft failures are 
self-reported [7]. Soft failures that are not self-reported can be 
very hard to detect and accurately localizing them is time-
consuming and very costly. 
Even though failures cannot be avoided, quick detection, 
identification, and recovery of faults are crucial aspects in the 
successful deployment of telecommunication networks.          
A network fault that goes unattended for a long period of time 
can cause both tangible and intangible losses for the company 
that provides the service, as well as for its clients. Therefore, 
the current trend is for more and more networks that are 
virtually uninterruptible.  
Currently, carriers are bound to service-level agreements 
(SLAs) with their customers guaranteeing that the customer 
will be provided with services with a prescribed service 
availability (e.g., 99.999% availability - equivalent to less than 
5 minutes of down time per year), with financial penalties if 
the SLA availability is not met. It is therefore clear that in 
optical backbone networks it is essential to have effective fault 
recovery mechanisms to prevent the loss of information due to 
fiber cuts or equipment failures, which may occur often enough 
to cause major service disruptions. 
Furthermore, the constant growth of traffic in computer 
networks mainly due to popular services such as cloud 
computing and content-oriented networks, has triggered the 
need to develop an efficient and scalable optical transport 
platform for capacities beyond 100 Gb/s. One of the 
technologies, which enables improved use of flexible optical 
network is a scalable and efficient architecture called Elastic 
Optical Networks (EONs). The key innovation of EONs 
compared to currently used WDM (Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing) networks is the possibility of using sub-
wavelength granularity with 6.25 GHz slices for low-rate 
transmission and super-channel connectivity for 
accommodating ultra-high capacity client signals within a 
common network [8]. Accordingly, the optical spectrum can be 
used much more flexibly compared to the fixed grid of 50 GHz 
channels in WDM.  
One of the consequences of the flexible grid provided in 
EONs, is the possibility to provision asymmetric traffic where 
demands of the same bidirectional connection between a 
particular pair of nodes have different bandwidth requirements 
in each direction. Especially, in the context of network 
survivability based on path protection, this option seems very 
attractive, since significant savings of network resources in 
terms of optical spectrum should be obtained.  
Although much research has been performed in the area of 
optical networks’ reliability and survivability over the last two 
decades, there are still many practical issues that need to be 
addressed for the successful commercial implementation of 
fault recovery techniques in optical networks. In this paper, we 
identify the most important of them, with invited sections from 
panelists based on their presentations at IEE/IFIP RNDM 
(Reliable Networks Design and Modeling) 2013 [9]. In 
particular, in Section 2, we outline the fault recovery 
challenges related to fault detection, localization, and recovery 
related to physical layer impairment issues, shared protection, 
as well as switch design considerations, especially for the case 
of transparent or translucent optical networks, where the signal 
remains in the optical domain for the entire end-to-end path or 
for large parts of the path. In Section 3, we extend our 
investigation to the case of multiple failures. Next, in Section 
4, we investigate applicability of reliability mechanisms in the 
context of Elastic Optical Networks. In Section 5, we address 
the resilience and recovery issues concerning multiprovider 
multilevel networks, while Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Fault Recovery Challenges 
A number of challenges can be identified for the practical 
implementation of recovery techniques in mesh optical 
networks including issues related to control and management 
(such as fault detection, isolation, and recovery), design of the 
optical switch architectures, as well as design of the 
protection/restoration algorithms and techniques.  
An important aspect for fault management is the signaling 
capability in the network. Most current optical networks use an 
Optical Supervisory Channel (OSC) for remote node 
management, monitoring, and control [10]. The OSC is a low 
bandwidth (STM-1) out-of-band (usually at 1510 nm), full 
duplex point-to-point communication and control channel. It is 
a common practice to use the Digital Communication Channel 
(DCC) section of the STM-1 header or the General 
Communication Channel (GCC) of OTN for this purpose. In 
every managed node (e.g., amplifier, regenerator, cross-
connect) the channel is dropped, the relevant data is inspected, 
instructions are performed, and possible replies are added. The 
OSC can efficiently detect link failures, node failures, and 
some soft failures if they are self-reported. Link failures are 
immediately detected at the upstream amplifier, so the span 
where the failure occurs is efficiently localized. 
The cost of the OSC is quite low and does not currently 
warrant deployment of separate monitoring equipment for link 
failure localization. Moreover, its main function is to provide 
communication for configuring and maintaining amplifiers, 
equalizers, and other network equipment along the links. Some 
alternatives for the OSC have been proposed, such as work in 
[11], where a hybrid supervisory plane is envisioned, but the 
benefits, mainly speed, over the current OSC may not warrant 
the cost of deploying multiple transparent wavelengths, as time 
savings at each managed site would be on the order of 100s of 
microseconds. 
 
For efficient network reliability, we need to be able to 
detect, localize, and identify failures in the network [12]. This 
means that we need to have monitoring points in the network, 
either as part of the transmission system (e.g., Forward Error 
Correction (FEC) units in the receiver [13]), as part of the 
control loop of a device (photodiode in an amplifier), or a 
dedicated monitor. Protection mechanisms can restore the 
traffic immediately after a failure is detected on the working 
path (e.g., Loss-of-Signal Payload (LoS-P) in SDH [5] or Bi-
directional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IP/MPLS [14]-
[15]), but for restoration mechanisms we also need to localize 
the failure in order to efficiently re-route traffic around it.  
Detection should always be as fast and reliable as possible 
– false or missing alarms should be rare – but localization 
requirements can be a trade-off between accuracy, speed, and 
cost. Failure localization for recovery purposes should use 
simple, cost-effective devices, be as fast as possible, and be 
sufficiently accurate to allow routing the traffic around the 
failure. Localization for repair purposes could be allowed to 
take more time (hours or days), but should be as accurate as 
possible. The devices required for accurate localization (such 
as test devices, optical spectrum analyzers, and optical time-
domain reflectometers - OTDRs) are prohibitively expensive to 
deploy ubiquitously in the network. 
We can say that two (inter-dependent) aspects are 
important: where to place which type of monitor and how to 
efficiently correlate the alarms raised by these monitors. 
General probabilistic models for localizing network failures 
have been examined; however, they typically focus on the sub-
problem of alarm correlation.  
In [6], a probabilistic approach is examined where a 
hierarchical causality tree is used to identify the most likely 
problem. Work in [16] assumes that alarms only carry 
information about the emitting node, while work in [17] makes 
use of Alarm Reporting Functions in order to create classes of 
objects and [18] defines a hierarchical dependency graph 
consisting of services, protocols, and functions and defining 
multiple failure modes per element. 
The placement of components is another important topic. 
Work in [19] showed the feasibility of a fault detection scheme 
for all-optical networks based on their decomposition into 
monitoring-cycles (m-cycles). To detect and localize network 
faults, it is not necessary to put monitors on all links, 
lightpaths, or nodes. M-cycles were extended to more general 
structures, such as m-trails [20] and m-trees.  
While most solutions proposed in the literature are sound, 
their application domains may need revision. M-
cycles/trails/trees types of solutions could prove useful for 
locating difficult to find soft failures that affect all channels 
(note that m-cycles/trails/trees operate on separate wavelengths 
than the actual traffic). Locating soft failures that affect only a 
single channel (necessary for efficient repairs) is still a difficult 
issue which remains, to our knowledge, largely unresearched. 
After the failure has been detected, there are still challenges 
that need to be addressed in practical implementations of fault 
recovery in transparent/translucent optical networks. Some of 
these include: 
 physical layer impairment considerations, 
 shared protection considerations, 
 switch design considerations for transparent nodes in opaque 
networks. 
 
(a) Physical Layer Impairment Considerations  
In backbone optical networks, the trend is for next-generation 
mesh optical networks that are evolving from opaque (with 
electrical components providing optical-electronic-optical 
(OEO) conversions at all network nodes), to translucent (where 
OEO conversions are sparsely provided at a few network 
locations, while some of the connections can stay in the optical 
domain throughout), and eventually to transparent (all-optical) 
networks where the nodes provide pure optical switching and 
the signal is never converted back to the electronic domain 
until it reaches the receiver at the destination node. 
In the opaque approach, all switching and processing of the 
data at the nodes can be handled by electronics (opaque 
node/opaque network), or the node switch fabric can be 
transparent while still maintaining transponders at the WDM 
systems (transparent node/opaque network), thus again 
providing OEO conversions at all network nodes.  
In terms of survivability, opaque architectures are flexible 
in the sense that they have access to the electrical signal 
overhead and they can readily provide all the necessary control 
and management functions, including fault detection, fault 
isolation, as well as fault recovery. Furthermore, they only 
require link-to-link engineering, thus simplifying the design of 
the fault recovery techniques.  
Opaque switching nodes (with an electronic switch fabric 
and transponders present in the WDM systems) are the ones 
that are currently deployed by the network operators in core 
optical networks. However, although this is a well-established 
technology, the large number of optical-to-electrical-to-optical 
(OEO) conversions at each switching node greatly increases 
the network cost, the power consumption, as well as the 
footprint required to deploy these switches. Furthermore, these 
architectures cannot keep pace with the growth in capacity of 
optics in the near future and the rapidly growing customer 
demand for bandwidth [21].  
It is envisioned that at some point in the future, the network 
operators will eventually move to all-optical architectures for 
future core mesh optical networks mainly driven by cost and 
bandwidth considerations [22]. These transparent networks are 
extremely desirable as they provide bit-rate, protocol, and 
modulation format transparency, and are more efficient in 
terms of cost, power, and footprint. In transparent networks, 
however, there are several challenges that need to be addressed 
before such architectures can be deployed. Some of these 
challenges relate to the implementation of efficient fault 
recovery techniques and include the following:  
 The physical layer impairments (PLIs) incurred by the non-
ideal optical transmission medium accumulate along an 
optical path limiting the transmission reach of optical signals 
[23]-[27]. As PLIs accumulate, end-to-end system 
engineering is now required in the network, something that 
creates several challenges when fault recovery techniques 
are designed. 
 
 Transparent optical networking solutions fail to recover the 
full functionality of the opto-electronic versions they replace 
without byte-level access. Therefore, it is a challenge to 
provide the control and management functionalities 
associated with the survivability process (such as fault 
detection (especially for the case of degradation failures), 
fault isolation, and fault recovery) that are readily available 
when we have access to the electrical signal.  
Even though, as mentioned earlier, there has been extensive 
work in the literature for the design of fault recovery 
techniques, only recently attempts were made to take the PLIs 
into consideration when designing fault protection/restoration 
algorithms.  
While various works have been proposed for the 
impairment-aware routing and wavelength assignment         
(IA-RWA) problem while maintaining the acceptable level of 
quality of transmission (QoT) of signals (in [28] a survey 
presents and analyzes most of the works in the literature on this 
subject), there has not been considerable work on the problem 
of designing impairment-aware fault recovery techniques that 
will ensure that in case of a failure event the recovery signal 
will reach its destination while also having an acceptable level 
of QoT. 
 
The importance of considering for the PLIs when designing 
fault recovery techniques is shown in Fig. 1 with the 
performance results obtained from [29].  
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Fig. 1. Comparison of tree-, segment- and cycle-based heuristics, when the 
PLIs are considered [29]. 
 
In this case, multicast protection is the goal and as the 
figure clearly shows, the absence of protection techniques 
specifically designed so as to also account for the PLIs (the 
arc-disjoint tree (ADT) and the Q-Based P-Cycles Heuristic 
(QBPCH) approaches shown in Fig. 1) can result in the 
utilization of techniques with unacceptable network 
performance results. Thus, when designing fault recovery 
algorithms and techniques in transparent networks, clearly all 
approaches considered must take the QoT issues into 
consideration (such as the segment-based (LP) technique 
shown in Fig. 1).  
The deployment of translucent network architectures that 
have been proposed as a compromise between opaque and all-
optical networks is another possible solution to this problem. 
Translucent networks are networks where signal regeneration 
is performed only at some specific network locations. By 
performing opto-electronic signal regeneration at some of the 
intermediate nodes, it is possible to recover the signal 
degradation due to physical impairments [30], so long as these 
regenerators are strategically placed in the network.  
 
(b) Shared Protection Considerations 
In a number of protection techniques proposed for mesh optical 
networks, sharability plays an important role, since reducing the 
redundant capacity in the networks is (together with the recovery 
speed) one of the main considerations. When sharing of the 
redundant facilities by a number of different (disjoint) primary 
paths is used, this means that after the failure event, the affected 
primary path will capture the previously shared redundant 
capacity to be used for the failure recovery of its signal.  
Running a protection protocol that includes sharing of the 
redundant network resources requires a certain number of 
information that is not readily available in core networks and 
may be difficult to acquire. Initially, the shared risk groups 
(SRGs) for a network need to be identified so that only primary 
paths that are not part of the same SRG may share redundant 
facilities. SRGs express the risk relationship that associates all 
the optical channels with a single failure as shown in Fig. 2 
[23].  
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Fig. 2. Shared Risk Groups [23]. 
 
Clearly, the network designers or the network operators 
need to identify and map these SRGs so that the recovery 
algorithms can correctly calculate SRG-diverse backup paths 
that will always provide a viable backup route in the event of a 
failure. However, a network topological view alone does not 
encompass the notion of SRGs and there is no obvious 
automated way to generate this information.  
Some early work in the literature proposed location-based 
approaches for SRG auto-discovery and SRG management, to 
replace the (potentially) erroneous manually maintained 
databases [31]-[32]. Nevertheless, this is still a practical 
consideration that must be taken into account. 
Another practical problem that needs to be addressed 
during the design of protection algorithms with sharability 
functionalities is the issue of the identification of the sharable 
channels. A channel is sharable, if all SRGs traversed by 
primary path are not already protected by the channel. This 
means that (with a deterministic approach) sharing information 
of every protection channel must be disseminated within the 
network. However, this information is not easily disseminated 
using a distributed protocol, thus limiting the feasibility of a 
deterministic approach to a centralized solution, something that 
can potentially create scalability problems in the future.  
A probabilistic approach was proposed in [33] as a possible 
solution to this problem that only requires the dissemination of 
summarized information (e.g., the limited information can 
comprise of the number of times each SRG is protected by a 
channel in the edge, rather than the exact information of SRGs 
protected by each channel as required by the deterministic 
approach). Even though performance results in [33] validated 
this approach, this issue requires further investigation for the 
practical implementation of shared mesh protection techniques.  
 
(c) Switch Design Considerations for Transparent Nodes in 
Opaque Networks 
Even if all algorithmic, protocol, and design considerations 
related to fault recovery are successfully addressed, there are 
still practical considerations for fault recovery that are inherent 
to the architecture of the switching nodes used in the network.  
Consider, for example, an opaque network architecture with 
a transparent switch (OEO transponders are present at the 
WDM systems, while the switch is completely transparent). 
This is potentially the transition architecture on the way to all-
optical networks, when the opaque switch approach eventually 
reaches scaling limitations in signal bit rate, switch matrix port 
count, and network element cost (even though opaque switches 
could still remain in the network architecture in order to 
provide network functions such as grooming and 
multiplexing). In such a network, architecture practical issues 
for effective fault recovery implementation are faced due to the 
lack of transmitters at the optical switch and the lack of direct 
access to the electrical signal and consequently to the overhead 
bytes [34].  
For example, in opaque switches, an unequipped signal is 
generated at every idle transceiver on the switch’s network-
side to prevent alarms in other equipment connected to the 
switch. In the absence of a keep-alive signal the following 
problems arise:  
 alarms will be generated at the WDM systems that have 
knowledge of provisioned channels but detect no light on 
those channels,  
 there is lack of monitoring of the protection channels to 
ensure availability when or if a failure occurs,  
 recovery time increases due to the additional time required 
to turn on the ITU grid WDM lasers. 
  
 Even though there has been some recent research activity 
on all-optical failure localization that does not need any optical 
layer signaling during recovery [35], lack of access to the 
overhead bytes still makes fault recovery features such as 
shared mesh recovery very difficult to achieve in a transparent 
switch without forfeiting the economies that the switch was 
designed to extract. Approaches to address these challenges 
principally consist of:  
 using the WDM transponders and client equipment (where 
OEO is performed) as proxies for the opaque functionality,  
 using out-of-band signaling between the WDM systems and 
the transparent switch, and between the switch and the 
client equipment (something that requires vendor 
interoperability and standardization), 
 using a bank of a few lasers at each node to address the 
unequipped signal generation problem [34].  
 
 However, even though most of the issues can be addressed 
via clever innovation as well as standardization efforts, they 
are still practical considerations that must be taken into account 
during design and implementation of fault recovery techniques.  
 
3. Assessment of Multiple Failures 
Optical networks can be subject to temporally correlated 
failures. Such failures may affect simultaneously or 
consecutively multiple network components (being of the same 
type or not). In this context, analysis of lifetime data can 
provide key insight on the corresponding failure patterns 
involving multiple network components (the term component 
refers here to network and node resources).  
The main difficulty in detecting and identifying these 
failure patterns and their underlying common (or root) cause 
arises from the limited amount of observation data available to 
the “decision” entity. Moreover, the spatial distribution of the 
network components that share common risks is often not 
directly observable or derivable from the individual failure 
occurrence that can be observed and corresponding rate that 
can be derived for each network component taken individually.  
The temporal correlation between failures of network 
components (referred to as joint failure events) implies that 
these components are spatially or spectrally inter-dependent. 
The corresponding rate of failure occurrence can be 
characterized by a joint failure rate following a generalized 
multivariate distribution, for instance, the Generalized 
Multivariate Weibull distribution. In this context, the usual task 
consists in estimating the unknown parameters of such a 
distribution from observation data.  
The applicability of parametric methods is nevertheless 
often limited (in non-formal terms: more specific/detailed 
distributions are not robust over time and simpler distributions 
lead to errors). Consequently, non-parametric alternatives are 
being thought including Recurrent Data Analysis by means of 
the Mean Cumulative Function (MCF) and Kaplan-Meier 
nonparametric maximum likelihood estimation. Nonparametric 
techniques, even though they provide interesting insight in 
terms of recurrence rate (slope of the MCF) and estimation 
of the survivor function, they provide little information for 
modeling the spatial and/or spectral relationships between the 
different components of optical networks.  
 
The main question concerning the analysis of lifetime data 
in optical networks is thus as follows: which technique should 
be considered in order to model the hidden spatial inter-
dependencies among its components? We first assume that 
information can be progressively inferred from the statistical 
nature of the failures experienced by the optical network 
(process referred to as learning from experience) as the input 
data, i.e., observations, is obtained online from a set of 
observers or monitoring points. Many classes of statistical 
learning techniques have been developed and each class 
comprises multiple variants. Determining which technique 
would suit the problem at hand, first requires the examination 
of the fundamental relationship between the statistical learning 
technique and the input data properties on which it performs.  
On the one hand, (most of) the commonly envisaged 
statistical learning techniques assume that: 
 propositional data are identically and independently 
distributed (“i.i.d. assumption”), implying that an element 
in the sequence is independent of the random variables that 
came before it, and  
 random samples of homogeneous data objects result from 
single relation.  
These common assumptions have to be contrasted with the 
intrinsic properties of real-world data sets, in particular, those 
characterizing optical networks. These environments are 
indeed characterized by data that are not identically distributed 
(heterogeneous) and not independent (multi-relational 
structures). For instance, a logical link failure can result from 
spectrally different wavelength failures and each of them can 
induce spatially different forwarding path failures. In other 
terms, out-of-the-shelf statistical learning techniques cannot 
effectively account for the intrinsic properties of the data 
characterizing these environments.  
Filling this gap is the main purpose of Statistical Relational 
Learning (SRL) [36] which combines i) relational logic 
learning to model complex relational structures and inter-
dependency properties in data with ii) probabilistic graphical 
models (such as Bayesian networks or Markov networks) to 
model the uncertainty on the data. The resulting process can 
perform robust and accurate learning tasks out of multi-
relational and inter-dependent data. In the context of optical 
networks, SRL is of particular interest when considering the 
objective of learning hidden dependencies between multi-
relational, heterogeneous, and semi-structured but also noisy 
and uncertain data. The shared risk detection problem from 
link failure observation data provides a representative example 
of such learning problem.  
Indeed, SRL is nowadays applied to social networks’ data 
analysis, hypertext and web-graph mining, etc. It is thus 
reasonable to also consider its potential in the context of the 
optical networks’ lifetime data analysis and mining. The 
motivations stem from the fact that the models learned from 
both intrinsic (propositional) and relational information 
perform better than those learned from intrinsic information 
alone. These models offer also better (predictive) accuracy, 
robustness, and understanding of the relational structures when 
processing heterogeneous and/or (inter-)dependent data sets. 
However, this learning technique induces a harder learning 
task and higher complexity. 
In the context of optical networks, applicability to fault 
diagnosis/root cause analysis such as shared risk detection 
would provide substantial benefit in increasing reliability of 
optical routing decisions in particular when (predictive) 
reactive adaptation of these decisions would be possible in 
response to (future) environmental changes (or changes in its 
interacting parts). 
(a) Statistical Relational Learning (SRL) 
SRL combines probabilistic graphical models (probabilistic 
learning and inference) to model and reason about uncertainty 
with representation language to describe relational properties 
of the data and complex dependencies between them (logical 
learning and inference). Graphical models provide a principled 
approach to deal with uncertainty and relational data by means 
of probability theory. These models represent dependency 
structure between random variables by joint distributions.  
Two types of graphical models are commonly considered: 
Markov(ian) networks and Bayes(ian) networks. On the one 
hand, Markov networks, described by undirected graphs, where 
edges do not carry arrows (no acyclic constraint) and have no 
directional significance, are useful for expressing symmetric 
relationships (soft constraints) between random variables. On 
the other hand, Bayesian networks, represented by Directed 
Acyclic Graphs (DAG), where edges have a particular 
directionality indicated by the arrows (acyclic constraint), are 
useful for expressing causal relationships between random 
variables. 
In addition to the distinction between undirected and 
directed graphical models, the differentiation between main 
representation syntaxes, i.e., first-order logic vs. frame-based 
representation provides a complete categorization of the 
different SRL models. One distinguishes, as part of the 
directed models, between rule-based models Bayesian Logic 
Programs (BLP) [37] and frame-based models Probabilistic 
Relational Models (PRM) [38] and, as part of undirected 
models, between frame-based models Relational Markov 
Networks (RMN) [39] and rule-based models Markov Logic 
Networks (MLN) [40].  
In Section 3(b), we extend the latter, i.e., the MLN model. 
Selection of this specific learning model stems from the 
following reasons: it suits control processes whose execution is 
causality-independent, it is more flexible when the data are 
made available sequentially (as it is the case when monitoring 
optical communication networks), and it enables exploiting 
data sparseness (condition met when only partial data is 
available upon occurrence of failures). 
(b) Incremental Markov Logic Networks (iMLN) 
These models have been designed independently on the input 
data arrival process, i.e., the processing algorithm performs on 
complete data set (in “batch mode”). However, when 
performing online learning in optical communication networks, 
data arrives following different temporal patterns (in 
“sequential mode”) and the model is to be updated as data 
arrives. As stated in the previous section, this is also one of the 
main reasons for selecting the Markov Logic Network (MLN) 
model as it supports sequential data. 
For this purpose, we extend the MLN model which 
represents a probability distribution over possible worlds to 
cover incremental updates from arrival of input data. An MLN 
is formally defined as a set of pairs of formulas    in first order 
logic and their corresponding weights    denoted          . In 
first-order logic, formulas are recursively built from atomic 
formulas (nodes of the Markov network). Each formula     has 
an associated weight   : the higher the weight, the greater the 
difference in probability between a world that satisfies the 
formula and one that does not, other things being equal. It is 
important to emphasize that an MLN becomes a Markov 
network only with respect to a specific grounding and 
interpretation. Indeed, atomic formulas  do not have a truth 
value unless they are grounded and given an interpretation. 
Thus, one requires that each node represents a ground atom, 
i.e., an atomic formula all of whose argument terms contain no 
variables). 
A possible world along with its interpretation assigns a 
truth value to each possible ground atom: when a world 
violates one formula, it is less probable although not 
impossible. The fewer formulas a world violates, the more 
probable it is. 
 
Together with a set of constants in the domain of discourse, 
an MLN defines a (ground) Markov network with i) one binary 
node for each possible grounding of each atomic formula or 
atom appearing in the MLN (the value of the  node is 1 if the 
ground atom is true and 0, otherwise) and ii) one feature    for 
each grounding of each first-order logic formula    in the MLN 
with the corresponding weight    (the value of this feature is 1, 
if the grounding of the formula is true; 0 otherwise). Each state 
of the ground Markov network, represented as a log-linear 
model, ) presents a possible world   (i.e., assignment of truth 
values to all possible nodes or ground atoms. The probability 
distribution over possible worlds   specified by the ground 
Markov network probability  is given by: 
       
 
 
             
 
   
 (1) 
In equation (1),   is the number of formulas in the MLN, the 
denominator   denotes the partition function used to make the 
summation of all possible groundings adding up to 1,    is the 
weight of the formula   , and       is the number of true 
(satisfied) groundings for the formula    in  . We also operate 
under the closed world assumption, i.e., if a ground atom is 
absent in the data, it is assumed to be false.  
Besides MLN structure learning (not covered in this 
section), the main learning task consists in learning MLN 
weights. Assuming we have at our disposal a given set of 
formulas               , the learning task consists in finding 
the respective weights                These weights can be 
learned generatively by maximizing the likelihood of one or 
more “possible worlds” that form training samples. To avoid 
requiring inference at each step, one can instead obtain the 
weights    from the pseudo-likelihood (PL) approximation of 
the joint probability distribution of a world   based on its 
Markov blanket. The Markov blanket (MB) of a node X is the 
minimal set of variables that must be observed to make this 
node independent of all other nodes in a model. In an undirected 
model, such as a Markov network, the Markov blanket includes 
the node’s neighbors in the graph. If   is a possible world and 
   is the  
   ground truth value, the PL approximation of    
given weights   is provided by: 
                          
 
   
 (2) 
The use of the pseudo-likelihood approximation does not 
require inference at each step and avoids the use of the partition 
function  . It is indeed impractical to perform exact inference 
on large Markov models because of the computations on the 
partition function  . 
On the other hand, a basic inference task consists in finding  
the most probable state of the world  given the evidence  , i.e., 
the world in which the sum of the weight of all satisfied 
groundings is maximized
1
. For this purpose, given the evidence 
 , it suffices to compute the following [41]: 
      
 
             
 
          
 
   (3) 
 
where         is the number of true groundings of formula 
   involving atoms  . 
 
Computation of equation (3) relies on a weighted SAT 
solver
2
 as corresponding from equation (1) to the weighted 
MaxSAT problem. In order to find a truth assignment that 
maximizes the sum of the weights of satisfied formulas, one 
can use (to avoid local optima while searching) the 
MaxWalkSAT solver [42], a weighted variant of the WalkSAT 
stochastic local-search (SLS) satisfiability solver. In order to 
predict the occurrence of most likely patterns given the 
observation of certain events (predictive inference problem), it 
suffices to compute given evidence  , the equation (3) by 
means of the MaxWalkSAT algorithm.  
Another key inference task consists in computing the 
probability       that a given formula    holds, given an MLN 
and possibly a set of one or more formulas as evidence. As the 
probability of a formula is the sum of the probabilities of the 
worlds   where it holds (               ), the 
conditional probability is given by: 
         
        
     
 
               
           
  (4) 
where    (  ) is the set of worlds where    (  ) holds and 
       is given by Eq.1. To avoid exponential time in the 
number of possible ground atoms, equation (4) can be 
approximated using probabilistic inference methods like 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). This algorithm samples 
a sequence of states according to their probabilities, counts the 
fraction of sampled states where the formula holds and rejects 
any state that violates one of them (i.e., it rejects all moves to 
states where    does not hold, and counts the number of 
samples in which    holds). However, as MCMC breaks down 
                                                          
1 In Markov networks, this task is referred to as MAP estimates 
2 A SAT Solver is an algorithm that decides if a propositional logic 
formula is satisfiable ; if satisfiable it produces an example of a truth 
assignment that satisfies the formula. 
when deterministic or near-deterministic dependencies are 
present, it is combined with satistifiability testing (by 
extending the WalkSAT solver) in the MC-SAT inference 
algorithm [43]. Using this procedure, it is possible to find for 
instance the probability that the formula    holds knowing that 
the formulas (evidence)   and   do. 
(c) Application to the Shared Risk Detection Problem 
Several applications of this learning technique include fault 
diagnosis and root cause analysis which covers shared risk 
detection. In the following, we aim at showing whether the 
MLN technique would be able (or not) to detect among the 
large possible set of (sometimes hidden) relationships between 
heterogeneous data which of these relationships characterize 
shared risks. Indeed, as stated earlier, MLN enables to 
compactly represent the dependencies between data and 
relations (compared to the approaches that process them 
independently) together with collective inference; hence, we 
could expect that MLN would deliver a more accurate 
predictive model about possible existence of risks shared by 
various optical network components. In the simplest instance of 
this problem, two links    and    share the same risk   (i.e., a 
physical resource shared by both links).  
 In case routing decisions would lead to the use of both link 
   (for the primary path) and link    (for the alternate path), if 
the resource underlying risk   fails then both paths would fail. 
For this purpose, assume we have at our disposal the following 
set of formulas           :  
 
 
 
 The learning task consists in finding the respective weights 
of these formulas considering we have the following constants 
in the domain of discourse     link   ,     link     and 
    shared risk. The ground Markov network corresponding 
to this MLN is depicted in Fig. 3, where   stands for Alarm,   
for failure, and    for Shared_risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3  Ground Markov network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  Ground Markov network (decomposition). 
The decomposition of the ground Markov network into 
“sub-networks” is represented in Fig. 4. The dashed entities 
represent the elements detected by one of the monitoring 
agents and the dotted entities those associated to the other. In 
the same figure, the grey vertices (SR(1,2) and SR(2,1)) 
represent the “shared atoms” between sub-networks.  
The important characteristic underlying this (ground) 
Markov network is the following: assuming the ground 
Markov network is learned incrementally from the information 
detected by individual agents (each agent being associated to 
one sub-network), a set of relationships has to be established 
where the size of this set reflects the number of ground atoms 
interconnecting these sub-networks.  
Further, we would like to predict the probability of 
occurrence of certain shared failure patterns between paths 
even though the detection that a given link “crosses” a given 
risk remains a local decision. To solve this predictive inference 
problem, it suffices to compute, using the a set of formulas as 
evidence  , the equation (4) by means of the MC-SAT 
algorithm. Using this procedure, the MLN model is able to 
determine for instance the probability that the formula: 
                                   
                    
holds, given that the formulas 
                                           and 
                                       do.  
 
Simulation results obtained by running the MLN model for 
a predictive inference task such as the shared prediction task 
confirm the inherent problem of decomposing a learning 
method originally designed to perform on data presenting 
(hidden) correlations but without accounting for their spatial 
distribution and sequential arrival. This observation leads to 
consider the MLN model decomposition for which the 
corresponding “shared atoms” can themselves correspond to 
sub-networks to improve the relationship creation process; the 
latter is of major importance to support scaling with respect to 
the number of information sources/agents.  
An important challenge thus consists in determining the 
best achievable tradeoff between learning performance 
(accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, etc.), relationship creation 
cost, and computational complexity of the SRL methods (in 
particular, when applied to predictive tasks). 
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4. Reliability in Elastic Optical Networks – Business 
Perspective versus Scientific Perspective 
Elastic Optical Network (EON) is another interesting recent 
proposal of an optical technology. The main novelty of EONs 
compared to currently used Wavelength Division Multiplexing 
(WDM) technology is the provisioning of sub-wavelength 
granularity for low-rate transmission and super-channel 
connectivity for accommodating ultra-high capacity beyond 
100 Gb/s. The EON provides a flexible optical grid; 
specifically, in EONs the frequency spectrum is divided into 
narrow frequency segments (we refer to them as slices) and  
the optical path (lightpath) is determined by its routing path 
and a channel, which consists of a flexibly (ad-hoc) assigned 
subset of slices around a nominal central frequency. EONs use 
slices of 12.5 GHz width, while WDM applies optical channels 
of 50 GHz. Therefore, EONs enable much more efficient usage 
of optical spectrum. Moreover, since in EONs lightpaths can 
be composed of many neighboring slices, high bit-rates (up to 
400 Gb/s) can be achieved, while WDM is currently limited to 
100 Gb/s.  
 There are two key elements in EON architectures, namely, 
bandwidth-variable transponders (BVTs) and bandwidth 
variable wavelength cross-connects (BV-WXCs). The role of 
BVTs is to adapt the client data signal to be sent to/received 
from the optical network with just enough frequency resources. 
Simultaneously, BV-WXCs are used to create an optical 
routing path through the network by switching transmitted 
signals within their frequency bandwidth to appropriate switch 
output ports [44]-[46].  
In the context of EONs, a new optimization problem arises 
called Routing and Spectrum Allocation (RSA). The RSA 
problem comprises of the selection of a routing path for each 
demand and the assignment of a contiguous fraction of 
frequency spectrum (slices) to the demand on the selected 
routing path (spectrum contiguity constraint). The RSA 
optimization problem is NP-hard [47] and it is more difficult 
than the corresponding Routing and Wavelength Assignment 
(RWA) problem in WDM networks. 
Two basic survivability approaches developed in the 
context of WDM networks can be also applied in EONs: 
Dedicated Path Protection (DPP) and Shared Backup Path 
Protection (SBPP). The former method assumes that each 
demand is assigned with two link- (or failure-) disjoint paths. 
Since both working and backup paths are allocated with 
spectrum resources and the signal is sent on both of them, the 
reaction to a potential failure is very fast and simple. The SBPP 
method also uses two disjoint paths. However, in order to 
reduce the utilization of resources, backup resources can be 
shared between the demands whose primary paths do not fail at 
the same time (contrary to DPP, for which each demand has its 
own backup resources). For more details on DPP and SBPP 
problems in EONs, refer to [48] and [49]. 
(a) Practicality from Business and Scientific 
Perspectives 
According to the Macmillan dictionary, practicality is defined 
as “the quality of being effective, useful, or suitable for a 
particular purpose or situation” [50]. However, the evaluation 
of features like effectiveness, usefulness, or suitability of a 
particular method or an approach can be different and depends 
strongly on background and context.  
 Here, we want to analyze the practicality of protection 
methods from two perspectives: business and scientific. In the 
former case, the practicality is mostly perceived as the 
possibility to direct application of a particular method in a live 
production network. According to the business needs and 
competition on the market, the business parties (e.g., telecoms) 
prefer to use methods that are widely tested and with proven 
performance reliability.  
 Therefore, in some cases, business parties are conservative, 
that is, they are reluctant to new approaches and methods. An 
important issue that must be underlined is the cost related to 
the transition to a new solution. If the expected cost  is high, in 
many cases business parties prefer to keep the old solutions.  
 Moreover, even if a new solution is finally introduced to 
the production network, many old procedures and habits are 
still in use, which can significantly limit the potential benefits 
of the new approach.  
 On the other hand, the scientific perspective provides a 
much more elastic approach, since the constraints that are very 
strong in the business world can be weakened or even totally 
removed from consideration. The scientific approach uses as 
the evaluation environment usually simulation software or 
some small testbeds. These tools provide much more flexibility 
in testing the network, compared to the live production 
network that is providing business services for numerous 
customers.  
Moreover, possible disruptions of the research network do 
not have so severe consequences as the potential problems that 
could arise in a real production network. Therefore, some ideas 
that proved substantial benefits according to a wide range of 
experiments made in research labs are not always  easily 
acceptable by the business world. However, since the 
researchers can have a broader view of the whole situation, 
compared to the business representatives, some innovative 
concepts can be developed earlier in scientific environments.  
(b) Protection of Asymmetric Traffic  
In recent years, we have observed a growing attention on 
services like cloud computing, content delivery networks 
(CDNs), grids, distributed storage, big data, video on demand 
(VoD), etc. As these new services are highly bandwidth-
demanding,  currently used WDM technology in the near 
future cannot be sufficient to provide the required capacity. 
Thus,  the new concept of EONs must be considered as a 
possible future optical technology. Moreover, these new 
services mostly lead to asymmetric traffic patterns in a 
backbone network [51]. Therefore, in this section we address 
the protection of asymmetric traffic in the context of EONs. 
For better illustration of traffic asymmetry in new services, let 
us consider a CDN system. 
 A CDN system can be defined as a set of mechanisms that 
enable delivery of various types of content to end-users on 
behalf of origin Web servers. The original content is offloaded 
from source web sites to other content replica servers 
geographically spread over the network. For each content 
request, the CDN system selects the best server offering the 
requested Web page. As a consequence, the CDN delivers the 
content from a replica server that is much closer to the end 
user, compared to the original web server. Due to the 
architecture of the CDN system, the downstream connection 
from a content server to a client node, usually has much larger 
bandwidth (capacity), compared to the upstream connection in 
the opposite direction. Consequently, the traffic between a 
normal node and the server node is asymmetric [52].  
 On the other hand, a common practical approach 
concerning real networks is the assumption that the traffic 
matrix is symmetric, i.e., demands of the same bidirectional 
connection between a particular pair of nodes have the same 
bandwidth in both directions. The capacity is selected as the 
maximum value between the downstream and upstream 
connection.  
 This approach follows from practices from the past, when 
most of the traffic was symmetric according to the old point-to-
point network services. As mentioned previosuly, business 
parties are in some cases conservative and not willing to 
introduce new concepts. Moreover, the fixed spectrum grid 
offered in WDM networks aggravated introduction of 
asymmetric demands (WDM provides connection of one fixed 
capacity (e.g., 10 Gb/s), therefore, on default the capacity of 
both the downstream and upstream connections between the 
same pair of nodes is the same). However, EON technology 
now enables quite easily the provisioning of asymmetric 
lightpaths. As a result, a common assumption regarding 
symmetric traffic demands in network planning and operation 
may be costly and not efficient in the new service context [51]-
[53].  
 To verify this issue in the context of survivability of elastic 
optical networks, simulations were performed using the NSF15 
network including 15 nodes and 46 links (Fig. 5).  
 
 
 Fig. 5. Topology of NSF15 network. 
 
 In order to examine the influence of traffic asymmetry, a 
parameter called asymmetry ratio (AR) was introduced and 
applied in the experiments. AR shows the average value of 
asymmetry between upstream and downstream demands for a 
particular set of demands. The asymmetry of one pair of 
demands (downstream and upstream) between the same pair of 
nodes is defined as max(h
Down
,h
Up
) / min(h
Down
,h
Up
), where 
h
Down
and h
Up
 denote the requested capacity (bandwidth) for 
downstream and upstream demands, respectively. The AR 
parameter is the average value over all demands. Two different 
lightpath provisioning models in terms of demand provisioning 
and traffic asymmetry were studied:  
  Symmetric (Sym) – for both upstream and downstream 
demands, the requested bandwidth is equal to the largest 
value, i.e., h = max(h
Down
,h
Up
). 
  Asymmetric (Asym) – each demand (upstream and 
downstream) is established with its original values of 
requested bandwidth. 
 
 Full mesh connectivity demands were generated, with 
bandwidth requirements created at random but following the 
selected value of the AR parameter. AR values 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
were tested and for each value of AR 10 demand sets were 
generated. The results presented below are average values over 
these 10 demand sets. To obtain the results, the AFA algorithm 
proposed and tested in [48] and [49] was applied.  
 Fig. 6 illustrates the corresponding results, showing the 
average link spectrum usage. In this case, three protection 
scenarios are compared: no protection (NP), SBPP, and DPP. 
For each of the protection approaches, the values obtained for 
the symmetric and asymmetric cases are shown. Obviously, for 
AR=1, both Sym and Asym approaches provide the same 
result.  
 With the increase of the AR value, it is observed that the 
symmetric scenario requires up to 30% more optical spectrum, 
compared to the asymmetric scenario. These results clearly 
demonstrate the potential gains of the flexible provisioning of 
bidirectional demands. In particular, if asymmetric demands 
are established between the same pair of nodes,  the spectrum 
consumption in the network can be substantially reduced. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Performance of various protection and asymmetry scenarios as a 
function of asymmetry ratio. 
 
 
 Clearly, the concept of Elastic Optical Networks is a very 
interesting proposal for a new scalable optical transport 
platform utilizing capacities beyond 100 Gb/s. However, 
business parties such as telecommunication companies are 
sometimes conservative and very often during the introduction 
of new technologies they are accustomed to previous concepts 
and methods. One of the examples illustrating this issue is the 
assumption of a symmetric traffic matrix, i.e., demands of the 
same bidirectional connection between a particular pair of 
nodes have the same bandwidth in both directions. However, 
the recent advent of many new services like cloud computing 
or content-oriented networking leads to a situation where the 
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traffic is strongly asymmetric. Therefore, in this section, the 
potential gains of using asymmetry in the context of 
survivability in EONs were discussed. Simulation results 
demonstrate that the asymmetry assumption can significantly 
reduce the optical spectrum usage (up to 30%), when compared 
to the classical approach with full symmetry of traffic. 
 
 
4.  Multiprovider Multilevel Survivability Challenges 
Most research into the dependability of networks has 
concentrated on a single level (optical restoration or IP-level 
connectivity) and a single provider (or Autonomous System 
(AS) in Internet terminology). While these techniques are 
necessary, they are not sufficient to provide end-to-end 
resilience to users. Resilience is the ability of the network to 
provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face 
of various faults and challenges to normal operation [54], and 
subsumes the disciplines of survivability (including fault 
tolerance), disruption tolerance, dependability (including 
reliability and availability), and performability.  
Users of network services are totally unaware of the 
mechanisms that individual optical or IP service providers use, 
nor are able to negotiate resilience contracts among service 
providers. Unless users are communicating across a single 
provider’s network, there are currently no available or 
deployed resilience, survivability, protection, or dependability 
services that can provide service assurance to end-users. 
As shown in Fig. 7, two users wish a resilient 
communications path between them. Assume that a single 
provider is not able to provide this service, and note that even 
if a single provider’s optical and IP paths could be used, high-
assurance communication requires multihoming in case a 
service provider fails. Therefore, each user is multihomed to 
two service providers, and multiple service providers are 
required on each path.  
 
 
Fig. 7 Diverse communication. 
 
While fault-tolerance requires only redundant components 
and paths, survivability to correlated failures requires diversity 
in multiple dimensions: geographic path and medium. Thus, 
not only should each path be provided by distinct service 
providers, these paths must be diverse, both in avoiding the use 
of shared components [55], [56] as well as geographically [56], 
[57].  
While shared link risk groups (SLRGs) [58] prevent 
multiple paths from suffering failures due to shared fate, this 
does not work across service providers. For example, the 2001 
Howard St. Tunnel fire [59] resulted in the melting of all 
service providers’ fiber optic cables when a CSX Railroad train 
burned. Thus, we need new models, mechanisms, and 
multiprovider multilevel capabilities to coordinate 
dependability among service providers across geographic 
paths. 
An abstraction of the multiprovider multilevel structure of 
the Internet is shown in Fig. 8. At the top level are users on 
end-systems (computers or mobile devices) attached to a 
service provider, as introduced in Fig. 7. The challenge is that 
the actual structure of the network is much more complex, and 
the practical aspects of a diversity service consist of getting 
sufficient geographic information at each level and across 
service providers.  
 
 
Fig. 8  Multiprovider multilevel Internet structure. 
 
The end-to-end path transits a set of service providers 
forming an AS (autonomous system) graph; it is possible to get 
public information about AS connectivity, for example from 
RouteViews [60]. Each vertex in the AS graph expands to an 
entire IP-level PoP (point-of-presence) graph, as shown in the 
third level from the top of Fig. 8.  
While the topology of each AS can be inferred using tools 
such as Rocketfuel [61], inferring the peering points that 
connect the ASs (dashed lines labeled IXP – interexchange 
provider) is more difficult. In some cases, likely 
interconnection can be inferred from membership in public 
IXPs such as MAE-East and MAE-West, but many peering 
points are privately linked between service providers [62].  
Finally, each service provider is overlaid on its fiber 
physical graph, shown in aggregate for all service providers. 
While this information is also generally not made publicly 
available, third-parties that mine public data (such as from the 
FCC – Federal Communications Commission and PUCs – 
public utility commissions in the US) use them to create per-
provider fiber maps [63]. 
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Thus, what is needed is an agreed API among service 
providers to exchange the abstracted geographic information 
necessary for the cross-layering to provide an inter-provider 
resilience service to users. 
This would permit a geodiverse resilient end-to-end 
service, as shown in Fig. 9. The application specifies its service 
(e.g., “real-time critical”) and threat model (e.g., “300 km 
diameter disaster”) via cross-layer control knobs to the resilient 
transport protocol ResTP. ResTP can then determine that the 
best way to deliver this service to the application is to establish 
a k=3 multipath transport connection, and request that the 
geodiverse routing protocol GeoDivRP establishes k=3 distinct 
paths such that no components are as close as d=300 [km] 
apart, and may also specify other parameters such as the stretch 
h (max additional hop count of paths with respect to the 
shortest) or maximum skew t delay between the paths.  
 
Fig. 9  Cross-layering for geographic resilience. 
 
While we can design and deploy ResTP without the support 
of service providers, a geodiverse routing protocol has two 
components. An intradomain routing protocol such as 
GeoDivRP can be deployed unilaterally by a service provider, 
by adding geolocation of routers to link state routing and a 
heuristic for creating geographically diverse paths [57], [64] 
using the cross-layering shown in Fig. 9. However, a 
geodiverse interdomain routing protocol must also present an 
API between the service providers that exchanges sufficient 
information to ensure that paths across providers are at least d 
apart. This is future research, but also provides a greater 
practical challenge for deployment. 
Finally, we need new graph-theoretic complex-system 
models to analyze the resilience of existing topologies and 
architectures to attacks based on the structure of the network, 
as well as to area-based challenges that result from large-scale 
disasters as given in the previous example. 
For this we need a multilevel and multirealm (domain) 
graph model, as shown in Fig. 10a (only a single provider is 
shown in this example) [65]. The bottom graph is the physical 
level; each higher level is an overlay with a subset of 
corresponding vertices and an arbitrary set of edge 
connections.  
 
     
 (a)    (b) (c) 
Fig. 10  Multilevel graph model. 
The overlay can survive edge deletion, and node deletions 
(except at a given location when all equipment simultaneously 
fail or are destroyed) as shown in Fig. 10b, unless the lower 
level graph is partitioned. In this case, the partition must 
propagate up the graph levels, as shown in Fig. 10c. By 
removing the nodes and links at the correct level for a given 
challenge (e.g., physical level for destruction of infrastructure), 
and propagating up to the user level, we can determine the 
resilience of the entire network.  
These deletions are either based on the structural properties 
of the network based on an attacker going after the most 
important nodes (e.g., based on degree or betweenness – the 
number of shortest paths passing through a node or link), or 
within a given area affected by a large-scale disaster [66]. 
Alternatives can then be tested that add links and nodes under 
cost constraints to increase the resilience of the network with 
the least cost, and protocol mechanisms that increase resilience 
[67]. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we focused on deployment issues of survivability 
and dependability mechanisms in optical networks. In particular, 
we discussed the current challenges concerning implementation 
of failure recovery techniques, as well as the related problems 
following e.g., from hardware constraints, and across multiple 
providers and levels. 
Although failures are inevitable, resilience, survivability, and 
fault recovery mechanisms can provide efficient means to 
provide uninterrupted service. However, as we discussed in this 
paper, the problem of fault detection, localization, and recovery 
becomes more difficult for the scenario of all-optical forwarding 
due to lack of electronic processing of a signal by the transit 
nodes of the lightpath. 
In the latter part of the paper, we concentrated on fault 
recovery issues for the new concept of Elastic Optical Networks, 
being in our opinion an important direction of optical networks 
evolution. Finally, we discussed issues related to fault recovery 
in multilevel multiprovider environments, where e.g., due to 
ownership-related problems, fault recovery strategies can be 
confined only to certain network areas.  
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